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Date:         Fri, 14 Nov 2003 18:22:23 -0500
Reply-To:     Dwight Buffum <Dwight.Buffum@TARGET.COM>
Sender:       "SAS(r) Discussion" <SAS-L@LISTSERV.UGA.EDU>
From:         Dwight Buffum <Dwight.Buffum@TARGET.COM>
Subject:      Securing passwords in SAS code

We are running SAS V8.2 and SPD Server V3.0 on Solaris. Our table-driven autoexec.sas startup routine assigns all of a user's normal SPDS librefs, which require SPDS passwords. Some of the passwords are for read-write SPDS IDs and should be concealed. The SAS log shows the LIBNAME statements with X's replacing the passwords. The problem is how to let a user's Solaris ID run our autoexec.sas routine without any of the following occurring: 1. reveal a password in the SAS log (ECHOAUTO, SOURCE2, SYMBOLGEN, MPRINT). 2. user browse or read passwords used as input to autoexec.sas routine.

We think we can minimize the risk of revealing a password in the SAS log by having a subroutine of the autoexec.sas routine generate Solaris environment variables which appear in the generated LIBNAME statements like: LIBNAME lib_spds SASSPDS 'domain' PASSWD="%SYSGET(PW_SPDS_RW)" ...;.

We request assistance in solving the remaining problem of securely generating the environment variables for the passwords under the control of the autoexec.sas routine being run by any user. We would also appreciate any additional insights and guidelines on this subject.

Regards,

Dwight Buffum MindTools, Inc. SAS Alliance Partner


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